

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/25 : CIA-RDP88G01116R001402570004-9

Page Denied

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**ROUTING SLIP**

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR		X		
4	D/ICS		X		
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA		X		
7	DDO		X		
8	DDS&T		X		
9	Chm/NIC		X		
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OLL				
14	D/PAO		X		
15	D/PERS				
16	VC/NIC				
17	D/CCISCS	X			
18	C/UDAC		X		
19	DER				
20					
21					
22					
SUSPENSE		Date _____			

Remarks

STAT

H/ Executive Secretary
10 Dec 86

Date

3637 (10-81)



POLICY

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-2000

Executive Registry

86-4915x/3

2 DEC 1986

In reply refer to:

I-86/17807

Honorable William J. Casey
 Director of Central Intelligence
 Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Casey:

This is in response to your letter of 29 October 1986 concerning press contacts in the Department of Defense, our experience in controlling sensitive information, and the success we have had in placing more emphasis on classifying only that information which needs to be classified.

The rules governing release of DoD information to the public, including, of course, to the press are set forth in DoD Directive 5230.9, "Clearance of DoD Information for Public Release." The essence of this Directive requires that public release of DoD information be approved by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) or one of its DoD Component equivalents.

As you know, we have done a lot of work to control sensitive information that is not classified, notwithstanding some legitimate criticism of the speed with which that work is being implemented on a DoD-wide basis. I view our principal effort in this area as being DoD Directive 5230.25, "Withholding of Unclassified Technical Data From Public Disclosure." This Directive implements 10 U.S.C. 140c, as added by section 1217 of P.L. 98-94 (the FY 1984 DoD Authorization Act).

Briefly, this law states that the Secretary of Defense may withhold from public disclosure, notwithstanding other provisions of law, any technical data with military or space application in the possession of, or under the control of, the Department of Defense, if such data may not be exported lawfully without an approval, authorization, or license under the export control laws, and provided further that the data are not subject to a general, unrestricted license or exemption in the Export Administration Regulations or International Traffic in Arms Regulations. We added one further test; the data also must be related to a militarily critical technology before they will be controlled under the Directive. DoD Directive 5230.25 has two major features: it provides for the withholding of DoD technical data that meet these conditions and for the provision of such data to requesters with legitimate requirements who have agreed in writing to keep the data out of the public domain.

A number of other DoD issuances are relevant to controlling sensitive but unclassified information. For example, in a specialized area of electronics, we have issued DoD Instruction 5230.26, "Very High Speed Integrated Circuits (VHSIC) Technology Security Program." This DoD Instruction covers the unclassified aspects of the VHSIC program and basically requires that involved contractors agree, through contracts that are being modified, to specified safeguards for both VHSIC information and devices.

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At the present time we are beginning the operations of the Defense Technical Information Center's (DTIC) Technology Screening Board. This Board was created to review technical DoD documentation determined by originators to be releasable to the public before it is forwarded to the Commerce Department's National Technical Information Service (NTIS). Placing this screening device in the DTIC/NTIS pipeline will enable us to take a second look at what we are placing on the world-wide market served by NTIS. I anticipate significantly less DoD information that is purely military in nature being provided to our adversaries as a result.

With respect to your last area of interest, that is, success that I have had in placing more emphasis on classifying only that information which needs to be classified, Deputy Secretary of Defense Taft issued a memorandum on 22 May 1986 regarding "Initial Classification of Information." It addresses the consequences of overclassification, exhorts original classification authorities to avoid overclassification, and directs that these officials be indoctrinated in the responsibilities of security classification as a prerequisite to the exercise of such authority. As evidenced by this latest memorandum which was issued at my request, we have top-level support for a better Information Security Program.

I trust that the foregoing will be useful. Please let me know if you need further information.

Sincerely,


Craig Alderman, Jr.
Deputy

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

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16	VC/NIC				
17	D/CCISCS	X			
18	C/UDAC		X		
19	D/Exec Staff		X		
20	ES		X		
21	ER				
22					
SUSPENSE		Date			

Remarks

STAT

H/ Executive Secretary
29 Oct 86
Date

3637 (10-81)

ER 4915/2

29 October 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Community Counterintelligence and Security
Countermeasures Staff

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: DoD Steps Toward Eliminating Unauthorized Disclosures

I am counting on you to keep track of the protections that exist in the Executive Branch against unauthorized disclosures. Will you follow through on the attached.



William J. Casey

Attachments:

1. Ltr to DCI, dtd 20 October 1986,
from Craig Alderman, Jr.
2. DCI's Response to above letter,
dtd 29 October 1986



ER 4915/1

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington D.C. 20505

29 October 1986

Mr. Craig Alderman, Jr.
Deputy Under Secretary for Policy
Department of Defense
Washington, D. C. 20301-2000


Dear Craig,

Thanks for your note laying out the steps taken by DoD toward eliminating unauthorized disclosures. I hope we will be able to get steps taken elsewhere in the Executive Branch.

Will you tell me what the existing rules are governing press contacts in the Department of Defense. I'd also be interested in your experience in controlling sensitive information and in the success you have had in placing more emphasis on classifying only that information which needs to be classified.

Congratulations on your good work.

Yours,



William J. Casey



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2000

86 4915x

20 October 1986

In reply refer to:
I-05089/86

Honorable William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Casey:

We in Defense share your concern over unauthorized disclosures and we practice a vigorous, unified program to preclude such activity and investigate assiduously when we find them.

We have taken the following steps toward eliminating unauthorized disclosures in DoD:

- (1) Controlled circulation of sensitive information.
- (2) Instituted a 16% across-the-board cut in the number of people holding security clearance in the past year.
- (3) Required an annual review of all distribution lists used for the dissemination of classified information to ensure that only persons with a need-to-know such information are listed.
- (4) Placed more emphasis upon classifying only that which needs to be classified.
- (5) Enforced existing rules governing press contacts.
- (6) Continued to investigate significant unauthorized disclosures of classified information, and where those responsible can be identified, deal firmly with them.

I agree wholeheartedly with you that a unified, positive approach to this problem can and will help us keep classified information from being indiscriminately disclosed to the public. You can count on our continued cooperation and support.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Craig Alderman, Jr.", is written over the typed name.

Craig Alderman, Jr.
Deputy

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

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16	VC/NIC				
17	D/CCISCMS		X 8		
18	C/UDAC		X 9		
19	D/Security/DA		X 10		
20	ER		X 1		
21					
22					
SUSPENSE		Date			

Remarks Enclosed Ltr responds to DCI's Ltr of 29 Sep 86, which forwarded the August (UDAC) report of Unauthorized Disclosures.

H
Executive Secretary

27 OCT 86

Date



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-2000

4915x

20 October 1986

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I-05089/86

POLICY

Honorable William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

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
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Craig Alderman, Jr.
Deputy

S-111-15

ODUSD/P, CI&S (CI&IP)
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Honorable William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505



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